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NOTES
APPARENTLY, "NO GOOD DEED GOES
UNPUNISHED*: THE EARMARKING
DOCTRINE, EQUITABLE SUBROGATION,
AND INQUIRY NOTICE ARE NECESSARY
PROTECTIONS WHEN REFINANCING
CONSUMER MORTGAGES IN AN
UNCERTAIN CREDIT MARKET
KEVIN M. BAUM'
INTRODUCTION

On October 6, 2003, the Lee family obtained the relief they
desperately needed-the same relief that many families who
have subprime mortgages need.1 Chase Mortgage Company

* Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458, 475
(6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
Articles Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John's
University School of Law; M.S. Ed., 2007, Queens College; B.S., 2003, State
University of New York at Stony Brook. I would like to thank Robert M. Zinman,
Retired Professor and Director, Bankruptcy LL.M. Program, St. John's University
School of Law and Kate Reilly, St. John's Law Review Notes & Comments Editor for
all of their suggestions, comments, and patience throughout the process of writing
this Note. Additionally, I would also like to thank David Gray Carlson, Professor of
Law, Benjamin M. Cardozo School of Law and Thomas Bailey, LL.M. Candidate, St.
John's University School of Law, for their help in refining the legal arguments found
throughout this Note. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their
unconditional love and support, which has made all of my successes in life possible.
' The Lee family's desire to refinance their mortgage is currently shared by
millions of Americans who have subprime mortgages. See SUBPRIME LENDING: AN
UPDATE OF THE ISSUES AND APPROACHES § 311] (Special Pamphlet, LexisNexis)

(2007).
[F]rom 2003 to 2005, the subprime share of all mortgage loan originations
rose from 7.9 percent to 20 percent. Subprime mortgages accounted for
approximately 12.8 percent of all outstanding mortgages during third
quarter 2006. Notably, seven of the top 20 subprime mortgage lenders are
either national banks or federally-chartered thrifts ....
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("Chase"), the bank that recently acquired the Lees' mortgage,2
agreed to refinance the mortgage. 3 The refinancing arrangement

Id. Subprime mortgages enabled previously unqualified individuals to receive
mortgages and buy homes. Id. § 2. Subprime borrowers generally present at least
one of the following credit risks:
* Two or more thirty-day delinquencies in the last twelve months, or one or
more sixty-day delinquencies in the last twenty-four months;
* Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior twentyfour months;
" Bankruptcy in the last five years;
" Relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a
credit bureau risk score ("F.I.C.O.") of 660 or below (depending on
the product/collateral) or other bureau or proprietary scores with an
equivalent default probability likelihood; and/or
* Debt service-to-income ratio of fifty percent or greater, or otherwise
limited ability to cover family living expenses after deducting total monthly
debt-service requirements from monthly income.
Id. § 2[1] [a]. Because of this increased default risk, these loans carried higher
interest rates and fees than their prime cousins. Id. Financial institutions were able
to make large sums of money off these loans because of their high price and the
practice of securitization. See id. § 2111 [a] [b]. The securitization process allowed the
institutions to sell their subprime portfolios at a profit while still retaining their
servicing rights. Id.
These profits were short lived because, not surprisingly, many of the subprime
borrowers were simply unable to pay back these expensive loans. See James R.
Hagerty, Foreclosures, Overdue Mortgages Increase Again; Troubles Extend into
Prime Loans Via Option ARMs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2008, at A3. This resulted in a
large increase in defaults and foreclosures. Id. ("For prime loans, 5.35% of loans
were past due or in foreclosure in the latest quarter. For subprime, the rate was
about 30%. In the latest quarter, 2.75/ of all loans were in the foreclosure process,
up from 1.40% a year earlier."). The subprime market subsequently collapsed,
causing ripples throughout the rest of the financial markets and a drastic drop in
housing prices. See Isabelle Clary, BlackRock's Fink: Full Recovery Will Require
Housing Revitalization, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 29, 2008, at 47. This
turmoil has contributed to the tightening of credit markets. See Michael A. Fletcher
& Neil Irwin, Bernanke Warns of 'Grave Threat' to U.S. Economy; Fed Chairman
Pushes Bailout, Citing Worsening Credit Market, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2008, at
DOI.
Due to the tightened credit market, subprime borrowers are stuck between the
proverbial rock and a hard place; they are unable to make their current payments
and unable to refinance their current mortgages. See Renae Merle, Resets Peaking
on Subprime Loans; Jumping Payments Raise ForeclosureProjections, WASH. POST,
July 1, 2008, at DOl. This unavailability of credit, which is driving the cycle of
foreclosures, has only driven this cycle further. See Kevin G. Hall, As Wall Street
Tanks, We're All Suffering; Banks Are Unable or Unwilling To Lend-"We Didn't
UnderstandIt....We Understand It Now," SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008, at Al.
Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458, 461
(6th Cir. 2008).
Flagstar assigned the Promissory Note and the Original Mortgage to the
Federal National Mortgage Association, in care of Chase Mortgage
Company, an Ohio Corporation... pursuant to an Assignment of Mortgage
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reduced the Lees' minimum monthly payments from $942.16 to
$567.31.' Despite their savings of nearly $400 a month, the Lees
were still unable to avoid bankruptcy. On March 4, 2004, the
Lees filed a voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.5 This
unfortunate turn of events left Chase in the precarious position
of not knowing the status of its mortgage.
Chase's problems arose from the timing of the perfection 6 of
its mortgage.7 During the refinancing process, the Lees granted
Chase a new mortgage.' Chase then executed a discharge of the
Although the new mortgage and the
original mortgage.9
discharge were both properly executed, there was a substantial
delay in recording both of these documents.' ° Because the
mortgage was recorded within ninety days of the Lees'
bankruptcy,1 1 the chapter 7 trustee ("trustee") was able to avoid
the mortgage as a preferential transfer. 12 As a result, Chase lost
its mortgage on the Lees' home and became a general unsecured
creditor.1 3 This meant that Chase would have to share the
that was recorded by the Register of Deeds in early 2002. By merger of
Chase Ohio into Chase, Chase became the holder of both the Original
Mortgage and the loan evidenced by the Promissory Note.
Id.

I1d.

Id.
I at 462.
Id. at 461.
6 For the purpose of § 547 of the Code, a security interest in real property, such
as a mortgage, is considered "perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such property
from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected
cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the transferee."
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A) (2006).
In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 461.
The mortgage was executed on October 6, 2003. Id.
The discharge was executed on October 27, 2003. Id.
10 Although the Register of Deeds received the discharge on November 12,
2003-sixteen days after the discharge was executed-it was not recorded for
another sixty-five days on January 16, 2004. Id. The circumstances surrounding the
recording of the new mortgage are less clear. Although the decision does not indicate
when the Register actually received the mortgage, it was not recorded until
December 17, 2003-seventy-two days after the mortgage was granted and fifty-one
days after the discharge was executed but about one month before the old mortgage
discharge was recorded. Id. Both recordings were valid under state law. Id. at 466.
11 The Lees filed for bankruptcy seventy-seven days after the mortgage was
recorded. Id. at 461.
12 Id. at 474; see also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006). The specific requirements of § 547 and the Sixth
Circuit's rationale for reaching its decision in Lee will be discussed throughout this
Note.
" See In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 462.
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proceeds of the home sale with the other unsecured creditors
instead of being paid the full balance of its mortgage before the
other unsecured creditors were paid anything. 14
A primary goal of bankruptcy policy in the United States is
"equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor."'5
Although a solvent debtor normally has the choice to pay any
creditor the debtor chooses, 16 in bankruptcy, a payment or
transfer of interest in property to one creditor over another
may constitute a "preference" under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code ("Code"), which allows the trustee to avoid certain
preferential pre-bankruptcy transfers. 7 After the transfer is
avoided, one option for the trustee is to force the creditor who
received a preferential payment to return that payment to the
estate under § 550 of the Code.1" Where the transfer is a security
interest, the secured creditor will lose his security interest in the
property, and therefore, become an unsecured creditor.19
Section 547(b) explicitly governs which transfers the trustee
In essence, any transfer made to a creditor by an
may avoid.'
14

See id. at 472.

1 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.01 (15th ed. 2008).
16 The lack of payments by a debtor will not preclude legal action against the
solvent debtor by the unpaid creditors outside of bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)
(2006) (imposing an automatic stay on the creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding).
17 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b); see also Kenan v. Fort Worth Pipe Co. (In re George
Rodman, Inc.), 792 F.2d 125, 127 (10th Cir. 1986) (discussing the requirements for
avoiding preferential transfers).
1- 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2006) ("[T]he trustee may recover, for the benefit of the
estate, the property transferred ... from ... the initial transferee of such transfer or
the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made ....").The trustee may also
recover a transfer from "any immediate or mediate transferee of such transferee." Id.
§ 550(a)(2).
" See, e.g., Superior Bank v. Boyd (In re Lewis), 398 F.3d 735, 747 (6th Cir.
2005) (finding that the defendant-creditor was unable to evade avoidance of a
mortgage on debtor's real property).
20 Section 547(b) provides that:
Except as provided in subsections (c)and (i) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an
insider; and
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insolvent debtor to satisfy all or part of an antecedent debt
within ninety days of a bankruptcy filing,2 which also enables a
creditor to receive more than it would have under chapter 7, may
be avoided.2 2
Granting a security interest in the debtor's
property is considered a transfer.2
This look-back period begins
once the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.24 Under the Code, a
transfer of a security interest in real property "is perfected when
a bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against
whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected
cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the
transferee .... 25
Realizing that a secured creditor may face potential
problems if it did not record the security deed instantaneously,
which may be impossible because of bureaucratic delays at the
states' real-property recoding offices, Congress enacted a grace
period.26 If the security interest is perfected within this grace
period, for the purposes of the bankruptcy proceeding, the date of
the transfer of the security interest will relate back to when the
lender issued credit to the debtor.27 This grace period has
subsequently been extended to thirty days under the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("2005
Amendments to the Code").2 ' This section serves to protect a
secured creditor who perfected within ninety days of the
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
"' Section 547 allows any preferential transfer to an "insider" to be avoided for
up to one year. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B). However, this Note focuses only on noninsiders,
and thus, this provision will not be discussed.
22 See id. § 547(b).
23 See Chase Manhattan Mortgage Co. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458, 474
(6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the recording of a new mortgage constituted a transfer).
24 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4).
" 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A) (2000). This has not been changed by the 2005
Amendments. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A) (2006).
26 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (2006); see also, e.g., Collins v. Greater Atl. Mortgage
Corp. (In re Lazarus), 478 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2007) (discussing the statutory
requirements under the pre-2005 Amendments to the Code).
27 11 U.S.C. § 547(e).
21 Id.; In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 465 n.2 ("BAPCPA increased the grace period from
10 days to 30 days.").

1366

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1361

bankruptcy filing but issued the underlying credit outside of that
ninety-day period. Traditionally, preferential transfers were
viewed as transfers from a debtor to a favored or powerful
creditor.2 9 However, this principle has been applied to avoid the
security interest of lenders who refinance with a debtor outside
the ninety-day period, but then record within the preference
period as well as beyond the bounds of the grace period.30
Although preferential transfers are voidable by the trustee,
this power of avoidance is not based on fault-generally, the
debtor's or creditor's motives for making the preferential transfer
are of no importance in bankruptcy." Preference actions serve a
dual purpose: (1) to prevent creditors from racing to the
courthouse seeking legal protection as the debtor slides into
bankruptcy, and (2) to achieve the goal of equal distribution to
creditors in the same class."
Section 547(c) provides affirmative defenses to preference
actions. 3 In the case of a late-recording refinancing lender, the
only statutory defense that the lender would be able to raise
would be that the transfer constituted a "contemporaneous
exchange."34 Section 547(c)(1) provides that a transfer cannot
be avoided if it was: (1) "intended by the debtor and the
creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a
contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor,"
and (2) "in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange."35
Circuits are currently divided over whether to apply a bright-line

" See Vivian Luo, Comment, A Preference for States? The Woes of Preempting
State Preference Statutes, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 513, 514 (2008).

30 See In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 14, 19. These mortgages were recorded after
the grace period in § 547 that would have allowed them to relate back to the date of
the original transfer. See Gold v. Interstate Fin. Corp. (In re Schmiel), 319 B.R. 520,
525 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005) (discussing a ninety-six day delay in recording a home
mortgage from the date of closing); see also infra Part II.B.
:314 WILLIAM L. NORTON JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON, III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 66:1 (3d ed. 2008).
32 See G.H. Leidenheimer Baking Co. v. Sharp (In re SGSM Acquisition Co.), 439
F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing the intended advantages of preference
actions).
13 The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (2006).
31 Id. § 547(c)(1)(B).
15Id. § 547(c)(1).
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approach, requiring that the transaction occur within the thirtyday grace period found in § 547(e) 36 or whether to take a flexible
approach and look at the totality of the circumstances.37
There are also applicable three common law defenses beyond
the statutory defenses found within § 547(c). There is currently
a circuit split over whether these lenders should be protected
by the earmarking doctrine.3" Moreover, circuits are split over
how to apply the state law doctrines, which vary depending on
the state, of equitable subrogation 39 and inquiry notice.40
"The earmarking doctrine applies whenever a third party
transfers property to a designated creditor of the debtor for the
agreed-upon purpose of paying that creditor."41 Although the
circuits agree that the doctrine is available, the split arises over
whether to view the refinancing process as (1) a single
transaction comprised of multiple parts, or (2) a series of multiple
transactions.42
Equitable subrogation, a state law doctrine, allows the
refinancing lender who paid off the prior mortgage to be
subrogated to the prior mortgage holder's properly perfected
lien. 43 Thus, under equitable principles, the refinancing lender
may assert the prior lender's status and priority. 44 Some circuits
"' See, e.g., Collins v. Greater Atl. Mortgage Corp. (In re Lazarus), 478 F.3d 12,
17-18 (1st Cir. 2007).
17 See, e.g., Gordon v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In re Hedrick), 524 F.3d 1175,
1187 (11th Cir. 2008), modified and reh'g denied, 529 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 631 (2008); Lindquist v. Dorholt (In re Dorholt, Inc.), 224 F.3d
871, 874 (8th Cir. 2000); Dye v. Rivera (In re Marino), 193 B.R. 907, 915-16 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1996), aff'd 117 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1997).
" See Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458,
468 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Dan Schechter, Refinancing Lender That Refinances Its
Own Mortgage Cannot Invoke EarmarkingDefense to Preference Liability [In re Lee
(6th Cir.)], COM. FIN. NEWSL., July 7, 2008 (critiquing the application of the
earmarking doctrine in In re Lee).
" See In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1181-82; see also Dan Schechter, Belated
Recording of Refinancing Mortgage Is Not PreferentialBecause Lien Relates Back to
Prior Mortgage Due to Equitable Subrogation; "Substantially Contemporaneous"
Defense Requires Consideration of Circumstances Surrounding Delayed Perfection
[In re Hedrick (11th Cir.).], COM. FIN. NEWSL., May 5, 2008 [hereinafter Schechter,
Equitable Subrogation] (critiquing the application of equitable subrogation in In re
Hedrick).
40 In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1183.
In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 468.
42 Id. at 468-69. The applicability of the earmarking doctrine depends on this
distinction. See infra Part II.
41 See Schechter, Equitable Subrogation,supra note 39.
44 See In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1182.
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have declined to apply this defense because these refinancing
lenders are both (1) barred under state law because they are
mere volunteers who do not have a legal or equitable duty to
refinance the debt and (2) are sophisticated institutions that are
aware of the Code's requirements.45
Inquiry notice, also a state law doctrine, provides another
possible way for a refinancing lender to prevent its mortgage
from being avoided. Inquiry notice "imputes knowledge of an
earlier interest to a later purchaser of an interest in land
whenever there is '[a]ny circumstance which would place a man
of ordinary prudence fully upon his guard, and induce serious
inquiry.' "" This imputed knowledge prevents a hypothetical
purchaser from obtaining bona fide status.47 Therefore, for the
purposes of bankruptcy, the mortgage would always be perfected
and would not constitute a preference.48
This Note asserts that Congress should amend the Code to
include an express statutory defense exempting home refinancing
Part I of this Note discusses the
from preference actions.
"contemporaneous exchange" affirmative defense codified within
§ 547(c)(1). Part II of this Note discusses the current circuit split
over whether the earmarking doctrine, a judicially created
defense, protects the security interest of a late-refinancing
lender. Part II further discusses the history of bankruptcy
courts, looking to substance of a transaction over its form.
Part II advocates that the Eighth Circuit's unitary transaction
approach to the earmarking doctrine is more appropriate than
Part III of this Note
the multiple transaction approach.
examines the doctrine of equitable subrogation as an alternative
defense to a preference action. Part IV of this Note discusses the
doctrine of inquiry notice and how it can protect late-perfecting
mortgages. Part V of this Note proposes an amendment to
§ 547(c) that would provide an express affirmative defense to
protect refinancing lenders against preference actions.

E.g., In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 473-74.
In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Page v. Will McKnight Constr.,
Inc., 639 S.E.2d 381, 383 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)).
46 See

47See Id.
48 See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A) (2006).
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CONTEMPORANEOUS EXCHANGES AS A DEFENSE TO
PREFERENCE ACTIONS

Section 547(c) provides statutory defenses to preference
actions.4 9 The only statutory defense that the new creditor in a
49 The

trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-(1) to the extent that such transfer was-(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such
transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value
given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was in payment of a debt incurred by
the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee, and such transfer was-(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; or
(B) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that was-(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that
contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such
agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected on or before 30 days after the debtor receives
possession of such property;
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer,
such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an
otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor;
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or
the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such
transfers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of
the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured
claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such security interest
exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later of-(A)
(i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this
section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this
section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security
agreement creating such security interest;
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section
545 of this title;
(7) to the extent such transfer was a bona fide payment of a debt for a
domestic support obligation;
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home refinancing could plausibly raise is that the transfer
was a "contemporaneous exchange."" ° If the new creditor can
establish this defense, the mortgage cannot be avoided.51 Under
the Code, a transfer may not be avoided if it was "intended
by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such
transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new
value given to the debtor" and was "in fact a substantially
contemporaneous

exchange. '"2

While the circuits recognize

this statutory defense, they have disagreed over the meaning
of "substantially contemporaneous."

This split, however, has

become less meaningful because of subsequent extensions to the
grace period under the 2005 Amendments to the Code. 3
The main disagreement over this section's applicability is the
length of time a creditor can wait to record its mortgage and still
have it qualify as a substantially contemporaneous transfer.
There are two interpretations of how long of a delay in recording
can still constitute a substantially contemporaneous exchange:

(8) if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily
consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is
affected by such transfer is less than $600; or
(9) if, in a case filed by a debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer
debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by
such transfer is less than $5,475.
Id. § 547(c).
," See id. Although this Note does not take this position, it has been argued that
"§ 547(c)(1) codifies and therefore abolishes earmarking." David Gray Carlson &
William H. Widen, The Earmarking Defense to Voidable Preference Liability: A
Reconceptualization, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 592 (1999). Even assuming that this
argument is still viable, which is not clear, "[i]t is certainly easier to find that an 11
day gap is substantially contempo[raneous] than a 35 day gap." E-mail from David
Gray Carlson, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, to author (Oct.
10, 2008, 2:16 PM EDT) (on file with author) (arguing that this conception of the
earmarking doctrine is still valid).
51 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1). The other defenses listed in § 547(c) are not
applicable to the single-shot transfer of a mortgage to a consumer.
52

Id.

" See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, § 403, 119 Stat. 23, 104 (extending the grace period in § 547(e)(2) of the
Code from ten days to thirty days).
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(1) a strict requirement that corresponds to the recording grace
period under § 547(e),54 and (2) a flexible approach that can
extend beyond the grace period.5 5
The First Circuit, which supports a strict requirement, has
cautioned that "the seeming flexibility [of § 547(c)(1)] is
deceptive. 56 One rationale for applying this strict application is
that not doing so would open a "Pandora's box of evils"'57 by
inviting litigation to determine whether a transaction is a
substantially contemporaneous exchange. 8 A second rationale is
that "li]n statutory construction, the more specific treatment
prevails over the general."5 9 The courts argue that by not
examining each case individually, they are "protect[ing]
against 'undermin[ing] limitations created by a more specific
provision'" 6 even though Congress chose not to enact a
requirement. However, this argument ignores the fact that
Congress could have chosen to write a bright-line rule, yet it
chose instead to use the contemporaneous exchange test.
Finally, proponents of the strict approach argue that reading the
statute to require a period is in accordance with the
exchange
congressional intent of the contemporaneous
1
affirmative defense to preference actions6 : Congress wanted to
ensure that a party on the verge of bankruptcy would still to be
able to continue buying goods using checks, which take longer to
clear, without sellers fearing the possibility of losing the payment
as a preference if the party later files for bankruptcy. 2 Section
these transactions
547(c)(1) was designed to prevent
from being considered avoidable preferences. 63 By contrast,
proponents of the strict approach argue that Congress's concern

"

See, e.g., Collins v. Greater Atl. Mortgage Corp. (In re Lazarus), 478 F.3d 12,
17-18 (1st Cir. 2007).
; See, e.g., Gordon v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In re Hedrick), 524 F.3d 1175,
1187-88 (11th Cir. 2008), modified and reh'g denied, 529 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 631 (2008).
" In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 17.

57 Ray v. Sec. Mut. Fin. Corp. (In re Arnett), 731 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 18; In re Arnett, 731 F.2d at 363.
'9

In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 18.

6' Id. at 19 (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996)).
61 Id. at 18; In reArnett, 731 F.2d at 363.
61See In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 18; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 373 (1977).
" See In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 18; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 373-74
(1977).
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with § 547(e) was "getting the mortgage recorded within a
reasonably brief and predefined period" and not whether the
exchange was simultaneous.6 4
Other circuits have rejected this strict approach, instead
adopting a flexible case-by-case analysis.6 ' These courts have
relied on a plain language approach to statutory interpretation. 6
They argue that the existence of bright-line rules in other parts
of the Code,6 7 coupled with the lack of a bright-line rule in
§ 547(c)(1), illustrates that while Congress could have enacted a
strict time rule, it chose not to do so.6" This leads to the
conclusion that Congress specifically intended a flexible rule.
"Instead of applying the strict [time] limit enumerated in
§ 547(e)(2), an inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the
particular transaction should be made to determine whether a
transfer was substantially contemporaneous in fact. '6 9 Courts
consider: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the cause of the delay,
and (3) the motivations for the delay.7 °
re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 18 (emphasis omitted).
See, e.g., Gordon v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In re Hedrick), 524 F.3d 1175,

61 In
15

1187 (11th Cir. 2008), modified and reh'g denied, 529 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2008),

cert. denied, 129, S. Ct. 631 (2008); Lindquist v. Dorholt, Inc. (Inre Dorholt, Inc.),
224 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2000); Dye v. Rivera (In re Marino), 193 B.R. 907, 915
(BA.P. 9th Cir. 1996), affd, 117 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1997).
6 See In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1186 ("We have no license to assume that
Congress did not mean what it said in § 547(c)(1)(B), but we are instead bound to
assume that it meant exactly what it said."); In re Dorholt, Inc., 224 F.3d at 874
("[T]he plain language of the statute is at odds with the trustee's bright-line test.").
17See, e.g., The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2006).
" See In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1187; In re Dorholt,Inc., 224 F.3d at 874.
69

In re Marino, 193 B.R. at 916.

70In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1190. In re Hedrick involved two cases heard
together on appeal. Id. at 1178. The Sharma case illustrated this argument.
Sharma-the debtor-and Gupta-a nondebtor who co-owned the home-refinanced
the home mortgage with ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc. ("ABN") on May 20, 2003.
Id. at 1184. On May 27, 2003, ABN sent checks to Union Planters Bank to cover
Sharma's outstanding balance and to Atlantic States Bank to cover Gupta's debt. Id.
The parties agreed that the earliest the checks could have arrived was on May 28,
2003, which was the date that ABN sent the mortgage to the Register's office to be
recorded. Id. The mortgage was recorded on June 10, 2003. Sharma and her
husband filed for a joint chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy on June 18, 2003. Id. at
1184-85. "The county clerk recorded the cancellation of the Union Planters and
Atlantic deeds to secure debt on the Sharma home on June 23 and 26, 2003,
respectively." Id. at 1185.
The trustee sought to avoid ABN's mortgage as preferential transfer under § 547(b).
Id. While the trustee did not disagree that the transfer was "intended to be [a]
contemporaneous exchange []for new value given to the debtor," he argued that it
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The Eleventh Circuit stated that § 547(c)(1) and § 547(e)(2)
serve two distinct purposes. 71 "Section 547(e)(2)(A)'s purpose is
to move some transfers that occur within the ninety-day
preference avoidance period and would otherwise be avoidable
outside of that period. '72 "By contrast, § 547(c)(1) does not fix
73
or move the date the transfer of an interest was made.
The Eleventh Circuit argued that if the two requirements
of § 547(c)(1)-first, the transfer was intended "to be a
contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor,"
and second, was "in fact a substantially contemporaneous
exchange"-are met, then it serves to not only relate the transfer
back to a date outside of the ninety-day avoidance period of
§ 547(b), but it also protects transfers that are made within
ninety days of bankruptcy. 4
was not in fact substantially contemporaneous. Id. The trustee argued that the
transfer was not in fact substantially contemporaneous because the recording fell
outside the ten-day period of § 547(e)(2). Reply Brief of Appellant at 30-31, Gordon
v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In re Hedrick), Nos. 07-11179, 07-11187 (11th Cir. July
9, 2007).
Rejecting this argument, the court noted that length of the delay is not dispositive.
In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1190 ("In considering the length of the delay, the nature of
the transaction and how long a creditor in that type of transaction usually takes to
perfect its interest in the normal course of affairs are relevant."). The court went on
to note that the most important factors may be whether the delay resulted from
(1) the lender's negligence or (2) the lender's intentional delay. Id. at 1191. ("In
particular, if the reason for delay is that the creditor is attempting to obtain secret
liens, then this factor will weigh so heavily against the creditor that it ordinarily will
be dispositive.").
The court looked to the "relevant facts" of the case when it determined whether the
delay in perfecting was reasonable given the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 1190.

It determined that under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, which will be
discussed in Part III of this Note, ABN perfected its interests eight days after the
closing on May 2008, the date that checks were likely received by Union Planters
Bank and Atlantic States Bank. Id. at 1191. The court went on to find that ABN sent
the mortgage to be recorded on the first business day after the federally required
rescission date. Id. Further, in this case there was no indication that "ABN was
attempting to acquire a secret lien or otherwise acted with bad faith." Id. Thus, the
court "conclude[d] that this was a substantially contemporaneous exchange under
§ 547(c)(1), so the trustee may not avoid it." Id.
71 Id. at 1188-89.
71 Id. at 1189. ("The transfers it applies to are those that take place within
eighty to ninety days before the petition is filed, provided that they are perfected
within ten days.").
73

Id.

71 Id.

("If both of [§ 547(c)(1)'s] conditions are met, the trustee may not avoid the
transfer even if it was perfected more than ten days after the exchange and even if it
occurred within ninety days, or nine days, or one day, of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.").

1374

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1361

Although this split exists, Congress, through the 2005
Amendments, expanded the ten-day period of § 547(e)(2) to thirty
days,7 5 which make this split less relevant. While a bank could
easily argue, and a court could agree, that a fourteen-day period
between closing a loan and recording a mortgage is substantially
contemporaneous, 7 it is now much harder to make the argument
that a mortgage that was recorded over thirty days after the
closing constitutes a contemporaneous exchange. Moreover, an
argument by a lender that delayed recording (or even delivering)
of its mortgage by several months constituted a contemporaneous
77
exchange probably would not even pass the "blush test."
However, because of the delays at some recording offices,
banks that file their deeds in a timely manner may still not be
able to record within thirty days, and thus, may still be able to
make a contemporaneous exchange argument. Notwithstanding
the uncertainty of the applicability of § 547(c)(1) under the
new Code, there are other common law defenses that a late
recording lender can assert: the "earmarking doctrine,"
"equitable subrogation," and "inquiry notice."
II.

THE EARMARKING DOCTRINE: A JUDICIALLY CREATED
DEFENSE IN PREFERENCE ACTIONS

Courts have created a common law preference action
defense, beyond the statutory protections of § 547,5 for third
parties who refinance an antecedent debt owed by the debtor. 9
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (2000), with The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (2006).
76 See Lindquist v. Dorholt (In re Dorholt, Inc.), 224 F.3d 871, 874 (holding that
a mortgage was a contemporaneous exchange even though it was recorded sixteen
days after the closing); but see Collins v. Greater Atl. Mortgage Corp. (In re
Lazarus), 478 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that a recording of a mortgage
was not a contemporaneous exchange because of the fourteen day delay in
recording). However, it is also possible that a mortgage recorded within the thirtyday period of § 547(e)(2) would not constitute a contemporaneous exchange.
" The "blush test" is simple: If, in making an argument, the lawyer can
look the judge in the eye and not blush, then at least the argument doesn't
seem outrageous to the lawyer. Of course, it could also be true that the
lawyer herself isn't blushing because she has no shame. The "blush test" is
not infallible. Still, it's not bad.
Nancy B. Rapoport, Avoiding Judicial Wrath: The Ten Commandments /r
Bankruptcy Practitioners,5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 615, 628 n.50 (1996).
71See 11 U.S.C. § 547.
See 5 COLLIER, supra note 15,
547.03[2] (discussing the "earmarking

doctrine" as a defense to preference actions).
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The "earmarking doctrine" applies "where the borrowed funds
have been specifically earmarked by the lender for payment to a
designated creditor, [courts have held that there is] no transfer of
property of the debtor even if the funds pass through the debtor's
hands in getting to the selected creditor."8 ° The refinancing
party, in order for the doctrine to apply, must prove that:
(1) there was an agreement between the debtor and a new
creditor that the funds would be used to pay a specific antecedent
debt, (2) the parties performed the agreement according to
its terms, and (3) the transaction made according to this
1
agreement did not result in a diminution of the debtor's estate."
Bankruptcy courts widely accept the earmarking doctrine
defense against a preference claim, "primarily because the assets
from the third party were never in the control of the debtor, and
therefore, payment of these assets to a creditor in no way
diminishes the debtor's estate. 82 As a result, a transfer to the
creditor that would have otherwise been a preference will not be
avoidable by the trustee.
However, there is a circuit split over whether the
"'earmarking' doctrine... protect[s] creditors whose otherwise
voidable late perfected security interest replaces the secured
claim of a previous creditor. 's3 This problem is exemplified by
the following hypothetical circumstance:
Bridgett and William Morrison owned a home in Fake Town,
Michigan. Bank A held a mortgage against this home. The
Morrisons refinanced the mortgage with Bank B on April 25,
2006, in an effort to lower their monthly mortgage payments.
The new mortgage was granted to Bank B to secure the
payment of $151,945. On April 30, 2006, Craig Jones, an
employee of Acme Title Company, delivered the mortgage to the
Imaginary County Register of Deeds. That same day, the title
company wire transferred money to pay off the Bank A
mortgage. Despite the fact that the new mortgage was
delivered to Imaginary County Register on April 30, 2006, it

" Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (Inre Lee), 530 F.3d 458, 467
(6th Cir. 2008).
McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (Inre Bohlen Enters., Ltd.), 859 F.2d
8
561, 566 (8th Cir. 1988).
12 Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th
Cir. 1986).
547.03[2] (noting the "harsh effect of section
83 5 COLLIER, supra note 15,
547").
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was not recorded until July 30, 2006, ninety-six days after the
April 25, 2006 closing. This delay resulted from overall delays
inrecording at the Register. The Morrisons filed their chapter 7
bankruptcy petition on September 26, 2006, sixty-two days after
the mortgage. The chapter 7 trustee brought an action under
§ 547(b) to avoid the mortgage as a preferential transfer
because it was within ninety days of bankruptcy and would
allow Bank B to be paid in full as a secured creditor rather than
84
sharing the proceeds with the general unsecured creditors.

Bank B's ability to use the earmarking doctrine in this situation
depends on whether the refinancing is viewed as either a unitary
transaction or as a transaction of multiple parts.8"
A.

The Unitary TransferApproach to Refinancing Transactions
Under the EarmarkingDoctrine

When the Eighth Circuit adopted the unitary approach, it
went in a "new direction," allowing a refinancing lender to
successfully assert the earmarking doctrine when the lender
failed to perfect within the statutory period of § 547(e).8 6 Under

84 This hypothetical is based on the facts set forth in Gold v. InterstateFinancial
Corp. (In re Schmiel), 319 BR. 520, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005), and will be used
to illustrate the different results throughout this Note. The dates have been changed
to allow the illustrations to reflect the thirty-day grace period enacted in the 2005
Amendments to the Code.
" See In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 468 ("[C]ourts have split over whether to
characterize the refinancing as a single unitary transaction or as a number of
parts.").
" See Kaler v. Cmty. First Nat'l Bank (In re Heitkamp), 137 F.3d 1087, 1089
(8th Cir. 1998); 5 COLLIER, supra note 15, 547.03[2]. In Heitkamp, the debtors
started building a home with a loan from a bank and credit from a subcontractor but
ran out of money during the construction. 137 F.3d at 1088. The debtors borrowed
more money from the bank to pay their outstanding balance to the subcontractors.
Id. As part of the new loan agreement, the bank issued a cashier's check to the
subcontractors in exchange for a mechanic's lien waiver from the subcontractors and
a second mortgage against the home. Id. Due to an oversight, the bank did not
record the new mortgage for five months. Id.
The debtors filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition three days after the mortgage
recording, causing the recording to fall well within the statutory period of § 547. Id.
The bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid the second mortgage as a preferential
transfer of the debtors' property under § 547(b). Kaler v. Cmty. First Nat'l Bank (In
re Heitkamp), Nos. 96-30260, 96-7035, 1996 WL 33366965, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.D.
Dec. 10, 1996), rev'd, 137 F.3d 1087, (8th Cir. 1998); see 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
The bankruptcy court rejected the bank's earmarking defense and set aside the
second mortgage as an avoidable preference. In re Heitkamp, 1996 WL 33366965, at
*3-4. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. In re Heitkamp,
137 F.3d at 1088.
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the unitary transfer theory of refinancing, the refinancing is
viewed in its entirety as a single transaction, consisting of
multiple steps. 7 Courts treat the payment to the creditor for the
antecedent debt and the granting of the security interest as "two
sides of the same coin."8 8 As one court correctly noted, "[t]o view
it any other way would be to elevate form over substance."' 9
Viewing the refinancing as a single transaction consisting of
multiple parts, the trustee would be unable to avoid Bank B's
mortgage on the Morrisons' home.
Under this approach, all of the elements of the earmarking
doctrine are met: (1) Bank B and the Morrissons agreed that the
secured funds would be used to pay specific preexisting debts,
(2) the agreement was performed according to its terms, and
(3) there was no diminution in the Morrissons' bankruptcy
estate. 90 In applying earmarking, the essence of the refinancing
would be such that Bank B was merely replacing Bank A's
security interest-the original mortgage-with its own security
interest: the second mortgage.9 1 Because the transfer of funds
from Bank B to Bank A and the Morrisons granting Bank B a
new mortgage are considered two parts of the same transaction,
the transfer of the mortgage interest did not diminish the

The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision holding that the bank's
second mortgage was protected by the earmarking doctrine. Id. at 1088. The court
noted that "[t]he bank and the [debtors] agreed the secured funds would be used to
pay specific preexisting debts, the agreement was performed, and the transfer of the
mortgage interest did not diminish the amount available for distribution to the
[debtors'] creditors." Id. at 1089. In applying earmarking, the court reasoned that
the essence of the transaction was such that the bank was merely replacing the
subcontractors' security interest-the mechanic's lien-with its own security
interest-the second mortgage. Id. The court dismissed the argument that
recognizing the security would be unfair to the unsecured creditors. Id. ("In these
circumstances, recognition of the bank's security interest does not give the bank an
unfair advantage over other creditors."). Although Heitkamp involved a case where
the original security interest was a mechanic's lien, this unitary approach has been
applied to refinancing transactions. See, e.g., George v. Argent Mortgage Co. (In re
Radbil), 364 B.R. 355, 359 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).
17 See Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 339 B.R. 165,
170 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev'd, 530 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2008).
88 Id.
89

Id.

In re Heitkamp, 137 F.3d at 1089; see also McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of
Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters, Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 1988).
9' See In re Heitkamp, 137 F.3d at 1089.
90 See
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amount available for distribution to the Morrisons' creditors.92
The court would properly deny the trustee's preference action,
recognizing that allowing the security would not be unfair to the
unsecured creditors because they never had any expectation of
receiving the proceeds from the sale of the home, unless there
was equity above and beyond the homestead exemption. 3 Given
that this is a judicially created doctrine, it is unclear why the
Eighth Circuit tried to fit refinancing transactions into a
preexisting view of earmarking, rather than simply expanding on
this doctrine.
B.

The Multiple TransactionApproach to Refinancing
Transactions Under the EarmarkingDoctrine

Although the Eighth Circuit's unitary approach examines
the substance of the refinancing transaction instead of its form,
other circuits have decided to take a more mechanical approach
that focuses on the form of the refinancing transaction instead of
its substance. 4
The unitary transfer approach has been
criticized as outside the scope of the earmarking doctrine.9
Under the multiple transaction approach, "a [re]financing
transaction involves [essentially two] distinct transfers": (1) the
payment by the new creditor for the antecedent debt, and (2) the
debtor granting the new creditor a security interest in the
debtor's property. 6
Under this theory, if the mortgage
recordation occurs within ninety days of the bankruptcy petition
and outside thirty days of the transfer of funds,9 7 then the

" See id. at 1089; see also The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer

Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).
" In re Heitkamp, 137 F.3d at 1089. ("In these circumstances, recognition of the
bank's security interest does not give the bank an unfair advantage over other
creditors.").
9'E.g., Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458
(6th Cir. 2008); Collins v. Greater Atl. Mortgage Corp. (In re Lazarus), 478 F.3d 12
(1st Cir. 2007).
15 5 COLLIER, supra note 15,
547.03[2] ("This unwarranted extension [of the
earmarking doctrine] has wisely been rejected by several courts.").
" In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 469. There are other steps involved in a refinancing
including "a pre-arranged use of the proceeds of the loan to pay off the old loan and
the release of the old mortgage." In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 16.
" This application to the Morrisons' hypothetical assumes that the creditor
cannot assert any of the other statutory defenses of § 547. See 11 U.S.C. § 547.

NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED

2009]

1379

mortgage constitutes a voidable preferential transfer.98 As such,
the trustee could avoid Bank B's mortgage on the Morrisons'
home in bankruptcy. 9
Courts have rejected the unitary approach, stating that it
ignored "the plain language of section 547(b) in the case of a
belatedly-perfected transfer of a security interest."10 0 A court
following the multiple transfer approach would still agree that
the first two elements of the earmarking doctrine are met:
(1) Bank B and the Morrisons agreed that the secured funds
would be used to pay specific preexisting debts, and (2) the
agreement was performed according to its terms. °1 Under the
multiple transfers approach, the Morrisons "made a new
mortgage in favor of [Bank B]" and "[t]hen, when [Bank B] paid
1 2
off [Bank A's] loan, the latter released its own mortgage.""
Applying a plain language approach, the court would reason that
this new mortgage, which was outside the thirty-day grace
period, constituted a voidable preferential transfer.'01 Applying
Lazarus, "the earmarking concept does not provide [Bank B] an
escape from the plain language of section 547(b) in the case of a
belatedly-perfected transfer of a security interest."'0 4
Thus,
following the multiple transfer approach, the trustee would be
able to avoid Bank B's mortgage on the Morrisons' home.' °
This multiple transaction approach to applying earmarking
to refinancing transactions has been adopted by more than one
circuit."16 While these courts are unwilling to allow a new
refinancing lender to assert earmarking, courts have gone
further to totally bar the defense when the new lender and old
07
lender are the same entity, as in the Lee case.

. In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 472.
. See id.
10 In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 16; see also In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 470-71.
"o See In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 470; see also McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo
(In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 1988).
102 In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 16 (emphasis in original).
0'

Id. ("The debtor did not act merely as a bailee with the mortgage passing

through her hands from [the old lender] to [the new lender].").
104

See id. The First Circuit criticized the unitary approach, saying that it

"amounts
10. In
100 In
1o'In

to ignoring the statutory language." Id.
re Lee, 530 F.3d at 472; In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 16.
re Lee, 530 F.3d at 470; In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 15-16.
re Lee, 530 F.3d at 470.
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In Lee, the Sixth Circuit also rejected the unitary transaction
approach as "ignor[ing] the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy
1 8 The Sixth Circuit declined
Code.""
to extend the earmarking
doctrine because Chase was not a new lender. °9 This conclusion
relied on the court's reading of McCuskey v. National Bank of
Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.).'
However, the Bohlen
court stated that "[in every earmarking situation there are three
necessary dramatispersonae. They are the 'old creditor', (the preexisting creditor who is paid off within the 90-day period prior to
bankruptcy), the 'new creditor' or 'new lender' who supplies the
funds to pay off the old creditor, and the debtor." '
The Sixth
Circuit's construction of dramatis personae fails to perceive the
situation where a single actor plays more than one role. I2 In this
case, Chase simultaneously played the role of the old creditor and
the new creditor." 3 Moreover, if a new bank that refinances a
loan can be protected by earmarking because it does not lead to a
dimunition of the estate, it follows a fortiori that the original
bank that made the original loan should also be protected when
the original bank refinances that loan. However, the Sixth
Circuit did not end its analysis there;' 14 the court stated that it
would reject earmarking even if Chase was regarded as a new
lender."'

10

Id.

at 470.

Id.; see also McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.),
859 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating the rule for earmarking).
"') In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 470.
.. In re Bolden Enterprs., Ltd., 859 F.2d at 565.
12 For example, see DR. STRANGEILOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING
AND LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1964), where Peter Sellers played the roles

of Group Captain Lionel Mandrake, President Merkin Muffley, and Dr. Strangelove.
For another example, see COMING TO AMERICA (Paramount Pictures 1988), where
Eddie Murphy played the roles of Prince Akeem, Clarence, Randy Watson, and Saul.
Finally, although NORBIT (DreamWorks 2007) provides a modern example of this
principle, as Eddie Murphy again plays multiple roles, this author implores you not
to actually see this movie.
10 See In re Lee, 520 F.3d at 460.
14 See id. at 470.
"' Id. ("Yet even if we were to deem Chase to be a new creditor, the earmarking
doctrine would not shield it from preference liability under the circumstances of this
case."). The court explicitly rejected Heitkamp's unitary transaction approach as
being against the plain meaning of the Code. Id. ("The common theme in the
Supreme Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence over the past two decades is that courts
must apply the plain meaning of the Code unless its literal application would
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intent of Congress.").
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The Appropriatenessof the Unitary Approach to Refinancing
The Eighth Circuit's unitary transaction approach allows the
bankruptcy courts to encourage lending, while still working
within the constraints of the Bankruptcy Code. It recognizes
the true nature of refinancing, a borrower taking a secured
loan in order to reduce his monthly payments on a current
On the other hand, proponents of the multiple
loan.1 1
transaction approach claim that treating the refinancing process
as a single transaction with multiple parts violates the plain
C.

Initially, the court noted "[wihen the statute's language is plain, the sole function of
the courts-at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to
enforce it according to its terms." Id. (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (quotations omitted). Relying on
the definition of "transfer" in § 101(54) and § 547(e), the court concluded that the
refinancing process consists of multiple individual transfers. Id. at 471. The court
then rejected the use of earmarking to protect transfers of security interests. Id.
Further, the court stated that "applying earmarking to the transfer of a lien
interest-as opposed to a transfer of funds-extends the doctrine beyond its logical
limits. A debtor's grant of a mortgage lien in a refinancing transaction does not
involve a transfer of 'earmarked' property." Id. It is unclear why the court took such
a formalistic stance, especially given that earmarking is a judicially created
doctrine.
Next, the court found that earmarking was not applicable because the refinancing
resulted in a diminution of the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 472. The court reasoned
that the recording of the new mortgage encumbered nonexempt property that
otherwise would have been available to the unsecured creditors. Id. The court,
however, ignored the fact that the unsecured creditors received the same amount, if
not more, that they would have had the Lees never refinanced.
Finally, the court said that allowing Chase to use earmarking to insulate itself
would encourage creditors to create secret liens. See id. ("By enacting § 547(e) and
establishing a definite and firm 10-day time period for lien perfection (now expanded
to 30 days by BAPCPA), Congress sought to promote the Bankruptcy Code's policy of
discouraging secret liens on property of the estate."). Another court stated:
By contrast, section 547(e)'s 10-day limit is directed specifically to
mortgages and applies even if the loan and mortgage are exchanged
simultaneously. Congress' concern, therefore, was not with whether the
exchange was simultaneous or nearly so, but with getting the mortgage
recorded within a reasonably brief and predefined period. The aim was to
combat secret liens and protect those who might lend in ignorance of the
mortgage.
Collins v. Greater Atl. Mortgage Corp. (In re Lazarus), 478 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir.
2007). For additional authority, see Ray v. Sec. Mut. Fin. Corp. (In re Arnett), 731
F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1984) ("One of the principal purposes of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act is to discourage the creation of 'secret liens' by invalidating all transfers
occurring within 90 days prior to the filing of the petitions."). Given that there was
always a mortgage of record, this secret-lien analysis appears to be obtuse.
...See, e.g., In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 462 (noting that the debtor's monthly
payments were reduced by about four hundred dollars).
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meaning of the Bankruptcy Code." 7 This, however, depends on
how you view a mortgage-backed refinancing loan. The First and
Sixth Circuit take an overly formalistic approach.
Legally, a mortgage is "[a] conveyance of title to property
that is given as security for the payment of a debt or the
performance of a duty and that will become void upon payment
or performance according to the stipulated terms."" 8 In the
refinancing setting, the debt that the debtor secures is the new
lender's loan that pays the debtor's antecedent debt.' 19 This
ignores the everyday reality of the common conception of a
mortgage-that it is a secured loan to purchase a house. 2 '
Generally, in these refinancing transactions, the parties are
looking simply to exchange one more expensive secured loan for
another less expensive secured loan.12 ' Therefore, the parties to
home refinancing agreements intend that these loans be secured
by a mortgage.
By treating the refinancing process as one transaction
instead of multiple transactions, the bankruptcy courts are
following their well-established doctrine of elevating substance
over form.'2 2 The Eighth Circuit's unitary approach follows the
leading thought in fraudulent conveyance cases. It recognizes
that the parties intended for the "new creditor [to] merely step[]
In applying the
into the shoes of [the] old creditor."'23
See, e.g., In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 16.
LAW DICTIONARY 1031-32 (8th ed. 2004). By granting a first
mortgage, a debtor is transferring one of many rights in his real property. See
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE. L.J. 710, 723 (1916) [hereinafter Hohfeld I]; Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23
YALE. L.J. 16, 22-23 (1913) [hereinafter Hlofeld II]. Therefore, a refinancing debtor
11 BLACK'S

could not effectively grant a second "first mortgage" because he no longer possesses
that right to his real property. See supra Hohfeld I; supra Hohfeld II. Theoretically,
this leads to the conclusion that there has been no actual transfer, and thus, no
preference. See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006) (requiring a "transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property"). Since this argument has yet to be raised, its viability is uncertain.
119 See In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 13.
10 See Bailout Plan Is Far from the End of Nation's Debt Crisis, USA TODAY,

Sept. 25, 2008, at 11A ("With people unable to get mortgages ... home prices will
fall.") (emphasis added).
11 This assumes that the debtor is not incurring new debt by taking out a larger
refinancing loan than what is owed under the old loan.
121

See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.

Kaler v. Cmty. First Nat'l Bank (In re Heitkamp), 137 F,3d 1087, 1089 (8th
Cir. 1998).
123
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earmarking doctrine, the unitary transfer approach follows the
parties' intent and "collapses" the refinancing transactions to
conform to that intent. 124 Courts should adopt the unitary
approach because it (1) does not lead to a meaningful diminution
of the bankruptcy estate, (2) recognizes the intent of the parties,
and (3) follows the bankruptcy principle of elevating substance
over form.
1.

Lack of Any Meaningful Diminution of the Bankruptcy
Estate

Applying the unitary approach, by collapsing the refinancing
transaction, prevents the absurd disposition 125 of avoiding the
refinancing lender's mortgage. 121 Using the multiple transaction
approach's formalistic view, which allows the new lender to evoke
the earmarking doctrine to protect the security interest in the
home, will result in a diminution of the bankruptcy estate
"because the non-exempt equity in the [home] that otherwise
would have been available for distribution to [debtor's] unsecured
creditors became encumbered, and unavailable to unsecured
creditors .... 127 Proponents of this approach assert that this
result is consistent with § 547(e)'s purpose of discouraging secret
liens.12
However, the multiple transaction approach ignores the
From a holistic
common sense realities of the transaction.
standpoint, there has been no diminution of the estate because
the debtor's "assets and net obligations remained the same. 1 29
What is essentially happening in this situation is that the new
creditor is taking over the old creditor's security interest in the
house.13 ° Arguably, the refinancing lender may be able to avoid
this technical problem by actually taking over the old creditor's
security interest through an assignment of the mortgage. This

see also infra notes 135-156 and accompanying text.
Contra Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d
458, 470 (6th Cir. 2008).
121 In re Heitkamp, 137 F.3d at 1089.
127 In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 472.
128 Id.; Collins v. Greater Atl. Mortgage Corp. (In re Lazarus), 478 F.3d 12, 18
(1st Cir. 2007).
129 In re Heitkamp, 137 F.3d at 1089.
124 Id.;
125

130

Id.
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would seem to satisfy the First Circuit because, if the mortgage
bailee when
was assigned, then the debtor would be acting as
1
31
another.
to
creditor
one
from
mortgage
the
passing
2.

The Unitary Approach Is Consistent with the Bankruptcy
Principle of Elevating Substance over Form

Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. 13 2 When exercising
these equitable powers, courts are often asked to examine the
nature of transactions as they relate to the Bankruptcy Code.
Courts in bankruptcy proceedings have a history of elevating
"substance over form. 1 33 Through their substance/form analysis,
the courts will examine a transaction to see what its true
purpose was, not just focus on how it formally operates. 134 The
Eighth Circuit's conceptualization of refinancing-collapsing the
multiple transactions into one overarching transaction-is not
unique in bankruptcy proceedings.
a.

Letters of Credit: CollapsingMultiple Transfers into a Single
Transaction

The Fifth Circuit has used this collapsing method in a
preference action involving letters of credit. 3 ' In Kellogg v. Blue
Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), a business debtor
...In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 15.
12 See

Young v.

United States,

535 U.S. 43,

50 (2002)

("[B]ankruptcy

courts ... are courts of equity."); see also Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966)
("[Bankruptcy] courts are essentially courts of equity."); but see Edith H. Jones, The
Bankruptcy Galaxy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 269, 270-71 ("Approaching bankruptcy from the
standpoint of a law court instead of an equity court may, in my view, lead to a more
even balance between debtors' and creditors' rights.").
' See, e.g., In re Comdisco, Inc., 434 F.3d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying this
substance over form analysis to a business transaction designed to minimize a
corporation's tax burden); Gaudet v. Babin (In re Zedda), 103 F.3d 1195, 1203-04
(5th Cir. 1997) ("To achieve the equitable purpose of bankruptcy law... a trustee
must look at the realities of the situation and examine the true nature of all
transactions made on or within one year of the filing of the petition. Substance
trumps form."); In re Eastmare Dev. Corp., 150 B.R. 495, 501 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993)
("Illinois land trusts are similar to the nominee trusts prevalent in Massachusetts. A
line of cases from the Seventh Circuit elevate substance over form and hold that
trust beneficiaries are the actual equitable owners of the trust res.").
""0For a discussion of elevating substance over form in cross-default clauses
cases, see In re Sambo's Restaurants,Inc., 24 B.R. 755 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 54 B.R. 772 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985); and In re Plitt
Amusement Co. of Washington Inc., 233 B.R. 837 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999).
' Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586, 595
(5th Cir. 1988), reh'ggranted, 835 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1988).
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purchased oil from a supplier on credit but failed to make a
timely payment.13 6 The debtor then induced a bank to issue an
irrevocable standby letter of credit to the supplier for the
antecedent debt.' The terms of the letter of credit called for the
supplier to be paid in full if the debtor failed to pay its balance
within approximately a month and a half.3 ' The letter of credit
did not need a security agreement because the bank and the
debtor had a previous security agreement that covered all future
advances. 3
A customer who benefits from the provision of goods or
services most commonly arranges letters of credit.
"The
[customer] will request a bank to issue a letter of credit which
names the [supplier] as the beneficiary. Under a standby letter
of credit, the bank becomes primarily liable to the beneficiary
upon the [customer's failure] to pay for the goods or services."4
The independence principle dictates that the bank's obligation to
pay the supplier is independent from any obligation between the
customer and the supplier.14 1 "It is well established that a letter
of credit and the proceeds therefrom are not property of the
debtor's estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541. "142 When a bank honors
the letter of credit, it is using its own assets, and not those of the
debtor, to pay the beneficiary.143 Thus, the trustee cannot avoid
the payments because it is not a transfer of the debtor's
property.'4 4
However, the Fifth Circuit went beyond the form of the
transaction-a non-avoidable letter of credit-and examined its
substance. The court noted that the "letter of credit in this case
did not serve its usual function of backing up a contemporaneous
136 Id. at

588-89.

137 Id. at 589.
138

139

Id.
Id.

140 Id. at 590.

Id.
Id. at 589; see also In re W.L. Mead, Inc., 42 B.R. 57 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio,
1984); Leisure Dynamics, Inc., v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (Inre Leisure
Dynamics, Inc.), 33 B.R. 171 (Bankr. Minn. 1983); N. Shore & Cent. Ill. Freight Co.
v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (Inre N. Shore & Cent. Ill. Freight Co.), 30 B.R. 377
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); Inre M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 25 B.R. 608 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982).
143 In re Compton Corp., 831 F.2d at 589.
144 It is a threshold requirement of § 547(b) that the payment is a transfer of the
141
142

debtor's property. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
11 U.S.C. §§ 547-548 (2006); see also In re Compton Corp., 831 F.2d at 589-90.
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credit decision but instead served as a back up payment
guarantee on an extension of credit already in jeopardy. The
letter of credit was issued to pay off an antecedent unsecured
debt. 145 Because the debtor pledged his assets to secure this
letter, it became a transfer of the debtor's property.1 46 The
trustee could not avoid the bank's security interest because,
under state law, the security interest was perfected well outside
of the ninety-day period provided in § 547. 147 But since this case
involved two transfers-(1) one direct: the transfer of the
increased security interest to the bank; and (2) one indirect: the
Fifth Circuit
payment by the bank to the supplier1 48 -the
collapsed them, allowing the trustee to avoid the indirect transfer
because all of the requirements of § 547(b) had been met. 149 The
Fifth Circuit correctly looked at the parties' intent and collapsed
the direct and indirect transactions to protect the unsecured
creditors who would have been harmed had the court taken an
overly formalistic approach.

15 In re Compton Corp., 831 F.2d at 590.
14
147

Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548.
In re Compton Corp., 831 F.2d at 591.

The phrase "takes effect" is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code, but under
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 law, a transfer of a security interest

"takes effect" when the security interest attaches. Because of the future
advances clause in MBank's 1980 security agreement with Compton, the
attachment of the MBank's security interest relates back to May 9, 1980,

the date the security agreement went into effect. The bottom line is that
the direct transfer of the increased security interest to MBank is artificially
deemed to have occurred at least by May 7, 1981, the date MBank filed
its final financing statement, for purposes of a preference attack
against the bank. This date is well before the 90 day window of

Id.

11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A).
148 Id.

at 594-95.

of the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) have been satisfied in the
trustee's preferential attack against [the supplier]. There was (1) a transfer
of [the debtor's] property for the benefit of [the supplier] (2) for an
antecedent debt owed by [the debtor] (3) made while [the debtor] was
insolvent (4) within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition
(5) that enabled [the supplier] to receive more than it would receive under
a Chapter 7 liquidation. The net effect of the indirect transfer to [the
supplier] was to remove $585,443.85 from the pool of assets available to
[the debtor's] unsecured creditors and substitute in its place a secured

149 All

claim for the same amount.

Id. at 595.
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FraudulentConveyances: CollapsingMultiple Loans into a
Single Transaction

The bankruptcy courts, in cases involving fraudulent
conveyances,1 50 such as leveraged buyouts, have also applied this
collapsing model. Under the Code, the trustee or debtor in
possession ("DIP") has the ability to undo conveyances that were
actually or constructively fraudulent, either directly under the
Code1" 1 or under applicable state law.152 "Courts have 'collapsed'
a series of transactions into one transaction when it appears that
despite the formal structure erected and the labels attached, the
segments, in reality, comprise a single integrated scheme when
evaluated focusing on the knowledge and intent of the parties
15
involved in the transaction.""
This collapsing doctrine has been
generally applied to the following "paradigmatic scheme":
One transferee gives fair value to the debtor in exchange for the
debtors [sic] property, and the debtor then gratuitously
transfers the proceeds of the first exchange to a second
transferee. The first transferee thereby receives the debtors [sic]
property, and the second transferee receives the consideration,
while the debtor retains nothing.154
The HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank Court established a twopronged requirement to collapse such a series of transactions:
(1) "the consideration received from the first transferee must be
reconveyed by the debtor for less than fair consideration or with
"aOThis Section of the Note uses the term fraudulent conveyances instead of
fraudulent transfers because the cases it discusses arose in New York, which follows
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and not the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act. See Drenis v. Haligiannis, 452 F. Supp, 2d 418, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Compare
N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW

§§

270-81 (2009) with UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE

ACT § 4 (1918). The standard for constructive fraud is similar under both the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
Compare UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4 with UNIF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT § 5 (1984).
151See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).
152Section 544 of the Code allows the trustee or DIP to use any applicable state
law that would have been available to any creditor to avoid a transfer. See
11 U.S.C. § 544. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act provides a state law
remedy that allows a creditor to avoid fraudulent transfers. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT § 4; see also UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5.
151Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (In re
Sunbeam Corp.), 284 B.R. 355, 370 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
"4 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re M.
Fabrikant & Sons, Inc.), 394 B.R. 721, 731 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting HBE
Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 635 (2d Cir. 1995)) (quotations omitted).

1388

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1361

an actual intent to defraud creditors," and (2) the initial
transferee had "actual or constructive knowledge of the entire
' 55
scheme that renders her exchange with the debtor fraudulent.'
These requirements look to what the transferring parties
intended, not simply how they structured their transaction.
When examining these transactions, courts have "correctly
disregarded the form of [the] transaction and looked instead to
its substance. 15 6
i.

Leveraged Buyouts

This collapsing doctrine has been applied to leveraged
buyouts. A leveraged buyout ("LBO") "is a shorthand expression
describing a business practice wherein a company is sold to a
small number of investors, typically including members of the
company's management, under financial arrangements in which
there is a minimum amount of equity and a maximum amount of
debt."' 7 In a hypothetical transaction, Company B is acquiring
Company A through an LBO. Courts may apply this collapsing
doctrine when the LBO is structured in multiple steps. In the
first step, the bank lends money to finance the LBO to Company
A and secures this loan with mortgages on all of Company A's
assets.5 8 Company A then immediately turns the funds over to
Company B in exchange for an unsecured promissory note.15 9
Company B will also raise capital by selling "high risk bonds,
popularly known as 'junk bonds,'" that have high interest
rates. 160 Company B is using Company A's assets to partially
finance this transaction. The proceeds from this LBO are used to
pay Company A's equity holders and not Company A itself. The
LBO transaction causes Company A to become insolvent because
161
it will have obligations under the mortgage and bond debt.
15HBE Leasing Corp., 48 F.3d at 635.
"' Id. at 638; see also In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35, 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994), affd 68 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1995). But see In re Sunbeam Corp., 284 B.R. at
372-73.
117United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1292 (3d Cir.
1986). "The financing typically provides for a substantial return of investment
capital by means of mortgages or high risk bonds, popularly known as 'junk bonds.'"
Id.

d '58
See, e.g., id. at 1292-93.
k
See, e.g., id. at 1293.
160 See id. at 1292.
6 See id.
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If Companies A and B were to subsequently file a bankruptcy
petition,"' a court may collapse the two transactions-(1) the
transfer of funds from Company A to Company B, and (2) the
transfer from Company B to Company A's shareholders-into a
single transaction. While formalistically this LBO consists of two
separate transactions, in substance, "[t]he two exchanges were
part of one integrated transaction."" 3 This collapsed transaction
would constitute constructive fraud because Company A received
less than fair consideration for its loan obligations.6 4 In fact,
Company A received nothing as a result of the mortgage-its
shareholders received the benefit. Therefore, the court could
recover the transfer from the shareholders.1 6 5 Moreover, the
court could then order the bank that lent Company B the money
to finance the LBO "to disgorge fees, interest and other sums
paid to them" and also possibly leave them with "no claim for
'
what they disgorge or the outstanding LBO obligations." 166
c.

Applying Substance over Form to Refinancing

Bankruptcy courts should look to the substance of the
refinancing and collapse the series of transactions, just as they
do when hearing LBO and letters of credit cases. By examining
the form of the transaction, the multiple transaction approach
distorts the general principles of bankruptcy because it creates
artificial and convoluted class distinctions. Under this approach,
the refinancing lender is an unsecured creditor.16 7 Yet, as the
unitary approach recognizes when it looks to the substance, the
debtor and the refinancing lender intended the refinancing
lender to be secured, just as the old lender was secured.16
Furthermore, although the refinancing lender recorded late, it is
still validly secured under state law. Thus, the only issue is
whether the bankruptcy courts should allow the trustee to assert

62

This hypothetical does not depend on whether Companies A and B both file

chapter 7, chapter 11 petitions, or any combination on the two.
"' Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d at 1302.
164See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4 (1918).
15 Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d at 1307.
166 See

In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd 68

F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1995).
167See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d
458, 473 (6th Cir. 2008).

See Kaler v. Cmty. First Nat'l Bank (Inre Heitkamp), 137 F.3d 1087, 1089
(8th Cir. 1998).
16
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§ 574(b) to avoid this security interest as a preferential transfer.
Avoiding these transactions does not serve the purpose of
preference actions.16 9 While in many cases the refinancing lender
recorded the mortgages shortly before the debtor filed for
bankruptcy, 170 this was not done because the debtor was sliding
into bankruptcy. 171 A lender who refinances a home wants to
secure the loan in order to be adequately protected, not because
the individual debtor is showing signs of insolvency. 172 This is
not a situation where the refinancing lenders were creating
"secret liens ' 173 because anyone who looked would have seen a
lien on the property, albeit a different lien. 174 Moreover, even the
First Circuit recognized that in these situations, there is no
In reality, "[n]o
prejudice to the unsecured creditors."15
he
unsecured creditor ever had the slightest basis to believe that'1 76
would be entitled to recover his debt from mortgage proceeds.'
Not only did the refinancing lender's recording of its
mortgage not prejudice the unsecured creditors, it also arguably
the
transaction.
in
parties
involved
all
benefited
These refinancing agreements lowered the debtors' monthly
payments, 177 thus leaving more money for the debtors to pay
their unsecured creditors. Given that borrowers may currently
be unable to pay their expensive loans17 and the ever-increasing
prospect of bankruptcy, 179 bankruptcy courts should adopt a
By
policy that helps keep people out of their courtrooms.
" See G.H. Leidenheimer Baking Co. v. Sharp (In re SGSM Acquisition Co.),
439 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2006).
"' E.g., In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 461; Gordon v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In re
Hedrick), 524 F.3d 1175, 1180, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 2008), modified and reh'g denied,
529 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 631 (2008); Collins v. Greater
Atl. Mortgage Corp. (In re Lazarus). 478 F.3d 12, 13 (1st Cir. 2007); In re Heitkamp,
137 F.3d at 1088.
1 See In re SGSM Acquisition Co., 439 F.3d at 238.
172See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Steve Brown, Rates and Balances; Negative
Equity Leaves Homeowners in Money Pit, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 28, 1993, at

1H (discussing homeowners' inability to refinance their mortgages because they
owed more than their homes were worth).
re Lee, 530 F.3d at 472.
In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1183-84.
175See In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 16.
'In

1

6

In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 475 (Merritt, J., dissenting).

...E.g., id. at 462 (majority opinion).
171See supra text accompanying note 1.
171See Jennifer Toomer-Cook, Utah Bankruptcies Jump
MORNING

NEWS,

Oct.

1,5143,700263992,00.html.

4,

2008,

available

at

42%,

DESERET

http://deseretnews.com/article/
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removing the risk that the refinancing lender's security interests
will be avoided, the courts will act to encourage the banks to
reduce the debtor's monthly payments through refinancing, thus
allowing the debtor to pay his other debts. The unsecured
creditors will get the greatest amount if the debtor never files for
bankruptcy protection.
III. EQUITABLE SUBROGATION AS A DEFENSE TO PREFERENCE
ACTIONS

Beyond the earmarking doctrine, a refinancing lender can
raise the doctrine of equitable subrogation to protect a laterecorded mortgage. Under this doctrine, the new lender will be
able to assert the rights of the old lender's mortgage. 8 ° Because
the old lender's mortgage was recorded, the trustee would never
be able to be a hypothetical bona fide purchaser. Therefore, the
trustee cannot successfully bring a preference action, as the new
creditor's mortgage will be deemed perfect outside the ninety-day
Because equitable subrogation is a state
preference period.'
8
2
law doctrine,' whether a new lender will be able to assert this
defense will depend on where the debtor's home is located.
Michigan's Version of Equitable Subrogation
In Lee, the Sixth Circuit declined Chase's equitable
subrogation argument, noting that it was a "sophisticated
creditor facing a problem of its own making. 183 The court
applied Michigan's version of equitable subrogation. Under
Michigan law, "[e]quitable subrogation is a legal fiction through
which a person who pays a debt for which another is primarily
responsible is substituted or subrogated to all the rights and
Under this conceptualization of
remedies of the other."'" 4

A.

"o Gordon v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In re Hedrick), 524 F.3d 1175, 1180 (11th
Cir. 2008), modified and reh'g denied, 529 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 631 (2008).
...The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).
112 See In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1180 (applying the Georgia doctrine of
equitable subrogation).
18 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458,
473-74 (6th Cir. 2008).
...Superior Bank v. Boyd (In re Lewis), 398 F.3d 735, 747 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Med. Protective Co., 393 N.W.2d 479, 482
(Mich. 1986)).
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equitable subrogation, there is a threshold requirement that the
party seeking subrogation must have a "legal or equitable duty"
to make the payment in question, and thus is not a "mere
volunteer."'88 Therefore, Bank B would be barred from the outset
from using this doctrine to protect its mortgage on the Morrisons'
home because it had no legal or equitable duty to refinance their
loan. This requirement seems unnecessary, especially since, as
the Sixth Circuit itself said, it leads to a result that is "arguably
harsh."1 86
However, under the Sixth Circuit's reading of the doctrine,
even if Bank B could get past this initial hurdle, the trustee
would still be able to avoid the mortgage because the court would
likely find that the delay resulted from Bank B's negligence. The
Sixth Circuit has been unsympathetic to banks that seek to apply
this doctrine to protect late-recorded mortgages."8 7 It has set up
guidelines for applying this doctrine in refinancing cases. Under
these guidelines, courts consider: (1) the length of time of the
(3) whether
delay, (2) the excuse for the delay in recording, and
1 8
the bank was negligent in recording its mortgage.
Bank B failed to record the Morrisons' mortgage for over
three months. Because the Sixth Circuit is under the mistaken
belief that the lender is in total control of the recording
process,1 8 9 Bank B would not have a reasonable excuse and would
'8'Id. (citing Beaty v. Hertzberg & Golden, P.C., 571 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Mich.
1997)).
' In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 473.
117 The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly said that the refinancing banks are
"sophisticated creditor[s]" who created their own problems. Id. at 473-74; In re
Lewis, 398 F.3d at 747. However, given the numerous collapses of financial
institutions, it appears that the Sixth Circuit may be giving these banks too much
credit. See, e.g.,
Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank Failure, U.S.

Seizes, Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at Al (discussing the seizure and sale
of Washington Mutual by the federal government); Eric Dash & Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Regulators Push for Sale of Wachovia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at A15
(discussing the seizure and possible sale of Wachovia Corporation by the federal
government); Walter Hamilton & Peter G. Gosselin, With Markets on Edge, Fed
Takes Urgent Action To Calm Investors; It Aids a Fire Sale of Bear Stearns at $2 a
Share, Cuts a Key Rate and Broadens Lending to Investment Houses, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2008, at Al (discussing the deal brokered by the Federal Reserve to have
JPMorgan Chase & Co. acquire Bear Stearns); Risky Business Sinks Economy;
Former Treasury Secretary Blames Wall Street for Financial Calamities, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, Sept. 16, 2008, at C1 (discussing Lehman Brothers filing for chapter
11 protection and Bank of America acquiring Merrill Lynch).

" In re Lewis, 398 F.3d at 747.
189Id.
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thus be negligent.1 9 While there may be circumstances where a
bank that fails to record within the thirty-day period is actually
negligent, in the Morrisons' case Bank B was faced with a Catch22 1 9 1-it was impossible to meet this requirement because the
Register delayed recording the new mortgage. Even though
Bank B delivered the mortgage to the Register in five days, the
Register did not record it for another ninety-one days. The Sixth
Circuit seems to ignore the fact that once the document is
delivered, whether or not it is recorded and thus perfected 92 is
completely out of the bank's control. Although Bank B is unable
to use equitable subrogation to protect its mortgage in Michigan,
had the Morrisons lived in Georgia, there would have been a
different result-Bank B's mortgage could not have been avoided
because of equitable subrogation.
B.

Georgia's Version of EquitableSubrogation

Under Georgia law, equitable subrogation may be used by "a
party who 'advances money to pay off an [earlier] encumbrance
on realty either at the instance of the owner of the property or
the holder of the encumbrance ... [and] the new security is for
any reason not a first lien on the property.'"193 In a case such as
this "if the new creditor is 'not chargeable with culpable or
inexcusable neglect, [it] will be subrogated to the rights of
the prior encumbrancer under the security held by [it], unless
the superior or equal equity of others would be prejudiced
thereby.' "194 Therefore, the new creditor would be able to assert
the rights under the old mortgage, which would prevent the
trustee from avoiding the mortgage because no hypothetical bona
fide purchaser could take title superior to that of the new
190 This dismissive attitude ignores the situation that many banks face where

they cannot record a mortgage in thirty days because there is a delay in recording at
the Register. See, e.g., Gold v. Interstate Fin. Corp. (In re Schmiel), 319 B.R. 520,
522 (Bankr, E.D. Mich. 2005).

"' See generally, JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks
2004) (1961) (discussing situations where an outcome is theoretically possible but

where there is no existing set of circumstances in which that outcome can be

achieved).
192 MiCH. COMP. LAWS § 565.25 (2008).

...Gordon v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In re Hedrick), 524 F.3d 1175, 1182 (11th
Cir. 2008), modified and reh'g denied, 529 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 631 (2008) (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Hardy, 640 S.E.2d 18, 20 (Ga.
2007)).

"' Id. (quoting Hardy, 640 S.E.2d at 20.).
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creditor.195 While these requirements are similar to Michigan's,
'
from exercising
Georgia law does not bar "mere volunteers"196
1
97
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has been more
this doctrine.
amicable than the Sixth Circuit to banks seeking to apply this
The crux of this analysis requires the courts to
doctrine.1 9
examine when the actual transfer of funds took place'9 9 and not
to focus on the bank's delay in recording.
Applying this liberal interpretation to the Morrisons' case,
Bank B would easily be able to prevent the trustee from avoiding
its mortgage. Because Bank B's payment to Bank A for the
Morrisons' original mortgage was transferred within thirty days
of the closing, the transfer of the security interest would relate
back to the date of the closing. Therefore, the trustee would be
unable to avoid the mortgage because it would have been made
outside of the ninety-day statutory period of § 547(b).2 °9 Under
Georgia law, the Eleventh Circuit has another tool, inquiry
notice, which it can use to protect Bank B's mortgage on the
Morrisons' property.
C.

IncorporatingGeorgia'sEquitable SubrogationDoctrine
Within the Bankruptcy Code Is Problematic

Although applying the unitary transaction approach of the
earmarking doctrine will protect most refinancing lenders who
record their mortgages outside of § 547(e)'s thirty-day period, it is
still unavailable for a lender that refinances its own loan." 1 This
is essentially a situation where a lender is just lowering the
payments that the debtor is making to the same creditor."°2
Because the doctrine of equitable subrogation is derived from
state law, its applicability varies depending on the debtor's
"' The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).
1% In re Lewis, 398 F.3d at 747.
Hardy, 640 S.E.2d at 20.
Iin re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1191.
". Id. at 1184 ("Because the delivery and the closing occurred within ten days of
each other, the transfer was 'made' at the closing for purposes of § 547(e)(2)(A)'s
relation-back provision.").
200 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
211McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.), 859 F.2d
561, 565 (8th Cir. 1988).
202 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458, 462
(6th Cir. 2008). The creditor may be protected, however, if it simply modified the
original mortgage instead of recording a new one.

2009]

NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED

1395

location. °3 Refinancing lenders may be unable to use this
Codifying
doctrine because they are mere volunteers.0 4
Georgia's version of equitable subrogation within the Code
provides protection to these lenders, as well as lenders located in
circuits that have declined to extend the unitary approach to
earmarking to lenders who refinance their own loans.0 5
Courts' reliance on the idea that these refinancing lenders
are "sophisticated"2 6 exemplifies the difficulty with codifying this
doctrine. Equitable subrogation may be misused to allow judicial
manipulation that leads to an "unjust and unlawful result by
arbitrarily causing the lender to lose the entire value of a
perfectly valid mortgage for money the lender had advanced to
the debtor in good faith. ' 20 7 Although they should not, courts
like the Sixth Circuit are ignoring the fact that in some
circumstances, it is simply impossible to record within thirty
days of closing. 2 8 By focusing on culpability and inexcusable
neglect, the courts are able to serve the purposes of § 547preventing secret liens and a race to the courthouse by unsecured
creditors-while still preventing the refinancing lender from
being victimized by circumstances outside of its control.
Inevitably, courts will struggle with what constitutes inexcusable
neglect; therefore, more should be done to protect a refinancing
lender's security interest. Courts should continue to apply the
doctrine of equitable subrogation liberally for the purpose of
protecting lenders; however, Congress should not codify this
doctrine because mere codification would not resolve the issue of
late-recorded mortgages.

20 See Mort v. United States, 86 F.3d 890,893 (9th Cir. 1996).
204 Superior Bank v. Boyd (In re Lewis), 398 F.3d 735, 747 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing

Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Used Car Factory, Inc., 461 N.W.2d 630, 632
(Mich. 1999)).
2..See

Gordon v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In re Hedrick), 524 F.3d 1175,

1183-84 (1lth Cir. 2008), modified and reh'g denied, 529 F.3d 1026 (1lth Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 631 (2008).
201 See In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 474. Given the numerous collapses of financial
institutions, it appears that the Sixth Circuit is giving these banks too much credit.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
107 In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 475 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
208 See, e.g., Gold v. Interstate Fin. Corp. (In re Schmiel), 319 B.R. 520, 522

(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005).
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IV. INQUIRY NOTICE AS A DEFENSE TO PREFERENCE ACTIONS
Applying Georgia real property law to the facts of the earlier
Morrison hypothetical, no one could be a bona fide purchaser
from the Morrisons after Bank B recorded the mortgage because
a purchaser would have inquiry notice, thus no purchaser could
take priority over Bank B's mortgage. 0 9 It is not clear whether a
bona fide purchaser could take an interest superior to that of
Bank B between the time of the closing and the recording of the
mortgage.2 10 The Eleventh Circuit correctly recognizes that no
hypothetical purchaser would be considered bona fide because,
during this period, Bank A's mortgage was perfected and Georgia
recognizes that any purchaser would be on inquiry notice.21 1
Georgia's conception of inquiry notice "imputes knowledge of
an earlier interest to a later purchaser of an interest in land
whenever there is '[a]ny circumstance which would place a man
of ordinary prudence fully upon his guard, and induce serious
inquiry.' "212 Because of this duty of inquiry, a purchaser under
inquiry notice cannot be a bona fide purchaser if she acquires her
'
interest before a previous creditor's mortgage is cancelled. 13
Any
hypothetical purchaser who would find the old mortgage of
record would be under a duty to contact the old mortgager, who
would then notify the hypothetical purchaser that a new bank
had satisfied the debt. This would in turn lead the hypothetical
purchaser to contact the new bank that would inform her about
its mortgage.
Therefore, under no circumstances could the
hypothetical purchaser be considered bona fide.
Applying these principles, no one could have received a
security interest on the Morrisons' property superior to that of
Bank B's.
Before Bank B "recorded its security deed, a
hypothetical intervening purchaser would have inquiry notice of
'
[the deed] under [Georgia common law]." 214
After Bank B
recorded, any subsequent purchaser would be on constructive
notice of the mortgage, and thus could not be considered bona
1
21B
211
2

GA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-3 (2009).
See In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1182.
See id. at 1182-83.
Id. at 1183 (quoting Page v. Will McKnight Constr., Inc., 639 S.E.2d 381, 383

(Ga. 2006)).
'" See Rossville Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 154 S.E.2d
243, 246 (Ga. 1967).
211 In
re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1184; see also Rossville, 154 S.E.2d at 246
(expanding on the role of Georgia common law in this analysis).
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Therefore, because no hypothetical purchaser could
fide.21 '
obtain a security interest in the Morrisons' property superior to
Bank B's, the mortgage was perfected at the time of the
closing.2 1 6
Interestingly, both the Morrisons' and the Lees' mortgages
would have also been protected by this concept under Michigan
law. Michigan has a similar requirement to that of Georgia,
which imputes inquiry notice to a purchaser of real property in
order to successfully assert bona fide status.2 17 Because Chase
never asserted this defense,21 8 the court never decided this issue
in the Lees' case.219
A.

IncorporatingInquiry Notice Within the Bankruptcy Code Is
Problematic

Inquiry notice provides refinancing lenders with an added
level of security that comes from a bright-line rule, while still
preventing banks from creating secret liens. When the lender
refinances the debtor's original mortgage and fails to record
the mortgage within the statutory period, there is no way a
hypothetical bona fide purchaser could come in and take superior
title because "Itihere was always a 'perfected' (i.e., publicly
Any hypothetical purchaser
recorded) mortgage in place. 2'
would be on inquiry notice that the land was encumbered.22 1 It is
possible, no matter how improbable, that this purchaser would be
told by the old mortgage holder that the old mortgage was
satisfied but not that a lender had paid off the balance. However,
it stretches the imagination to believe that a company that
refinanced its own mortgage would notify a purchaser that the
2" See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-3 (2009); see also In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1184
(applying the statute to its facts and reaching the same conclusions).
21 See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (2006); see also In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1184 (finding the
mortgage perfected at the time of closing by relation back).
21 See, e.g., Smelsey v. Guarantee Fin. Corp., 17 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Mich. 1945);
see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 565.29 (2009) (codifying the common law rule).
21 Chase never raised the issue of inquiry notice in its brief to the court. See
generally Brief of Appellee, Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee),
No. 06-1538, (6th Cir. Feb. 16, 2007). Chase instead argued that the hypothetical
purchaser had actual or constructive notice. Id.
219 See generally Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530
F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2008).
221 Id. at 475 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
221 See In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1183.

1398

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1361

debtor owns the property free and clear of its security interest if
it has not yet recorded its mortgage. Under both of these
circumstances, no one would be misled into thinking that the
property was unencumbered.2 22
[Ilt seems to [be] mere legalistic manipulation of the language of
§§ 547(b) and (e) to arrive at the conclusion that the mortgage
and the house should be treated as a preference and set asidetaking the mortgage security away from the lender who had
simply agreed to lighten the load on the debtor .... 3
Inquiry notice does not act to encourage secret liens or a race
to the courthouse by unsecured creditors. By allowing for inquiry
notice, a lender who loans money to a home purchaser will not be
protected if it fails to record because there will not be a mortgage
of record against the purchaser. Any "man of ordinary prudence
fully upon his guard" would find no mortgage on record because
the old owner's mortgage would have been discharged.2 24 Thus,
he could be considered a bona fide purchaser and the trustee,
assuming that the other requirements of § 547 have been met,
could avoid the mortgage.22 5 This result would still encourage
the new creditor to record the mortgage to put the world on
notice.
However, incorporating inquiry notice into the Code is not
without problems. The first and most glaring problem with this
"solution" becomes clear when the facts of the Morrisons'
hypothetical refinancing are changed. Suppose that Bank A's old
mortgage had been discharged before Bank B's mortgage was
recorded and the other circumstances remained constant. Under
such circumstances, during the gap period, a hypothetical
purchaser would not find a mortgage of record. Therefore, a
"man of ordinary prudence fully upon his guard" would find no
mortgage on record, and thus would be considered a bona fide
purchaser.2 2 6 This would allow the trustee to avoid Bank B's
mortgage.22 7 Unlike the situation discussed above where the
2.2

See In re Lee, 530 F.3d at 475 (Merritt, J., dissenting).

223

Id.

Gordon v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In re Hedrick), 524 F.3d 1175, 1183 (11th
Cir. 2008), modified and reh'g denied, 529 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 631 (2008).
22, See
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).
226 In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d at 1183.
227 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (assuming that the other doctrines do not apply).
22
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refinancing lender waited to record, here Bank B promptly
delivered the mortgage to the recording office, which, due to its
own inner workings, recorded the discharge first. Therefore,
while inquiry notice does provide some protections to refinancing
lenders, there are still some circumstances where a refinancing
lender, through no fault of its own, would not be protected from a
preference action.
A second issue is that states are making policy choices when
they construct their common and statutory laws regarding
inquiry notice. As a result, the requirements of inquiry notice
Although Congress has
may vary from state to state." 8
the power to incorporate inquiry notice within the Code for
bankruptcy purposes only,22 9 the states have made clear policy
decisions, which should not be superceded by Congress because
there is a simpler solution to this problem. Therefore, this Note
proposes that Congress amend the Code to include an affirmative
defense in § 547(c) to cover these refinancing loans.
V.

THE NEED To PROTECT REFINANCING LENDERS

There is little doubt, given the ongoing credit crisis, that the
law, including bankruptcy law, should seek to encourage the
refinancing of the millions of outstanding subprime mortgages.
Although bankruptcy courts are equitable courts, they "do not
possess limitless power to 'do equity."230 These courts are
limited by the power vested in them by Congress.2 31
With these restrictions in mind, the bankruptcy courts
should work within their limited powers to encourage the
refinancing of loans within the bankruptcy context. These courts
need to encourage lending while still maintaining the general
principle of the Code that there should be "equal distribution to
'
The earmarking and
creditors within the same class."232
equitable subrogation doctrines, along with inquiry notice,
2. David Leibowitz, Residential Mortgage Issues in Consumer Bankruptcy
Cases, 2008 NORTON ANN. SuRv. BANKR. L., Part II, § 5.
229 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o
establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.").
220 In re Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc., 376 B.R. 903, 911 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2007).
2' Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 40
(1991).
232 United States v. Shepherd Oil, Inc. (In re Shepherd Oil, Inc.), 118 B.R. 741,
752 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990) (emphasis added).
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courts
with
bankruptcy
provide
the
currently
the ability to conform to their restrictions while promoting
refinancing.
Before discussing the virtues of these doctrines, it should be
noted that these refinancing banks might have been able to elude
the problem of preference actions had they taken an assignment
of the old mortgage and then entered into a modification
Under this arrangement, the
agreement with the debtor.
refinancing bank would be in a better position to argue that the
debtor had not transferred an interest in his property, but rather
the security interest passed "through the debtor's hands" and "he
is merely a kind of bailee." 3 Under this proposed arrangement,
the debtor arguably never grants an interest in his property
because the refinancing bank is receiving a preexisting mortgage.
It is unclear whether the modification agreement would be
considered a preference. However, given that this arrangement
of assigning mortgages does not seem to be the practice in some
circuits, those courts and Congress should adopt doctrines that
protect banks' security interests and encourage refinancing.
A.

ProposedAmendment to § 547(c) To ProtectRefinancing
Lenders

Although defense to preference actions-whether it be
contemporaneous exchanges, earmarking, equitable subrogation,
or inquiry notice-already exist for refinancing lenders, as we
have seen, some judges have been unsympathetic and have
misconstrued the law when lenders have tried to assert these
Codifying these defenses may prove problematic
defenses.
because even if Congress was willing to codify any of them, a
court-such as the Sixth Circuit-could still find ways not to
apply them properly, and therefore, allow the trustee to avoid the
new mortgage. Thus, we are still left with the question of how to
protect a refinancing lender's security interest in order to
encourage refinancing.

," See Collins v. Greater Atl. Mortgage Corp. (In re Lazarus), 478 F.3d 12, 15
(1st Cir. 2007).
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Occam's Razor suggests that the simplest solution to this
problem is probably the correct one.2 34 Section 547 of the Code
already enumerates a number of affirmative defenses which, if
established, prevent the trustee from avoiding an otherwise
preferential transfer. The simplest way to protect a refinancing
lender from having its mortgage avoided is to write in an
exception for refinancing transactions. The following proposed
amendment to § 547(c) would serve this purpose.
1.

2
Proposed § 547(c)(10)

35

§ 547(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a
transfer(10) that creates a perfected security interest on real property,
to the extent that such transfer was(A) made on account of a loan that refinances an antecedent
debt that was secured by such real property by a perfected
security interest;
(B) the parties intended to refinance this antecedent debt;
(C) the loan did in fact refinance this antecedent debt; and
(D) the parties intended that the refinancing debt be
secured by such real property through a perfected security
interest.
When Proposed § 547(c)(10) is applied to the Morrisons'
facts, Bank B would be able to defend successfully against a
preference action brought by the trustee seeking to avoid Bank
B's mortgage. At the start of the refinancing process with Bank
B, the Morrisons owed Bank A money under a loan that was
secured by a mortgage. Therefore, the Morrisons' refinancing
transaction created a "perfected security interest" on real
property that was made on account of the Morrisons' "antecedent
debt that was secured by such real property by a perfected

24

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (l1th ed. 2003) ("[A] scientific

and philosophic rule that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily which is
interpreted as requiring that the simplest of competing theories be preferred to the
more complex.").
21' As currently written, § 547 provides for nine exceptions. See Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (2006). This
author does not want to be responsible for a hanging paragraph should Congress
adopt this proposed exception. See, e.g., id. § 1325(a), hanging paragraph at the end.
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security interest"-their loan debt to Bank A, which was secured
Thus, Bank B would meet the first
by a mortgage. 3 6
requirement of Proposed § 547(c)(10).
The Morrisons went to Bank B intending to refinance their
mortgage with Bank A, and as a result of Bank B's loan, the
Morrisons refinanced their debt. Therefore, the second and third
requirements of Proposed § 547(c)(10) are met.23 7 This leaves
open only the question of whether the Morrisons and Bank B
intended the loan to be secured by a perfected mortgage. The
Morrisons executed a mortgage with Bank B, and Bank B then
delivered the mortgage to the Register-the office that records
the mortgage-which makes it a perfected security interest for
the purposes of the Code. 238 From these facts, it is evident that
the Morrisons and Bank B "intended that the refinancing debt be
secured by such real property through a perfected security
interest. '239 Therefore, Bank B would be able to successfully
defend, without having to go through the other defenses
previously discussed, against a preference action if Proposed
§ 547(c)(10) is adopted.
Moreover, had Proposed § 547(c)(10) been enacted at the
time the Lees filed their bankruptcy petition, Chase's mortgage
would have also been protected. When the Lees went to Chase to
refinance their home mortgage, the Lees and Chase intended the
new loan to refinance the old mortgage, and the actual
agreement did refinance the loan. Therefore, the first three
Additionally,
elements of Proposed § 547(c)(10) are met.2 40
because Chase recorded its mortgage, the refinancing loan was
Thus, Chase would have been
secured by real property.
protected had Proposed § 547(c)(10) been enacted at the time.
Under this proposed statute, the fact that Chase refinanced its
own loan would be irrelevant.
Proposed § 547(c)(10) recognizes the realities of recording a
mortgage. There are delays at the recording office that are
beyond the control of the new lender. By setting forth simple
requirements that a bank can meet, Proposed § 547(c)(10)
replaces complicated defenses that are often misapplied. This
236

See supra Proposed

117 See supra Proposed

§

547(c)(10)(A).

§ 547(c)(10)(A), (B).

11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3).
See supra Proposed § 547(c)(10)(D).
240 See supra Proposed § 547(c)(10)(A)-(C).
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works to protect a refinancing lender, who lowered a debtor's
monthly mortgage payments, from losing its mortgage in
bankruptcy. The law should work to encourage refinancing, not
to punish good deeds.24 1
CONCLUSION

Given that many Americans currently have subprime
mortgages that they cannot afford to pay, bankruptcy courts will
play an increasing role in the refinancing process. These courts
should adopt already existing doctrines that serve to protect
lenders and encourage refinancing that will hopefully keep
debtors out of their courts altogether. The unitary approach to
the earmarking doctrine, the doctrine of equitable subrogation,
and inquiry notice provide the necessary protections to lenders
who refinance loans.
Although ideally a lender should record within thirty days,
there is no sound bankruptcy policy to allow a trustee to avoid
the loan. The parties always intended the refinancing lender to
be secured, and the unsecured creditors will not receive less
than they reasonably expected to in bankruptcy if the mortgage
is not avoided. With these policies in mind, the courts should
elevate substance over form and collapse the refinancing into a
single transaction with multiple steps, thus allowing the lender
to assert the earmarking doctrine as a defense to preference
actions.
Moreover, because the earmarking doctrine, equitable
subrogation, and inquiry notice are unavailable to certain lenders
that cannot meet the doctrinal requirements simply because they
are located in the wrong state, Congress should codify Proposed
§ 547(c)(10). This proposed amendment to § 547(c) recognizes
that delays in recording may be outside the refinancing lenders
control. By looking to the parties' intent, Proposed § 547(c)(10)
examines the substance of the refinancing transaction and not its
form-a consistent theme of bankruptcy law. This amendment
recognizes the simple fact that there was a mortgage on the home
before the refinancing and after the refinancing. The only
change in circumstances is the terms of the loan, terms which

241 Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458,
475 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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often leave the debtor with more money each month to pay the
other unsecured creditors.
All of these protections ensure that lenders are protected
when refinancing, thereby reducing the risks of lending. While it
is true that the bankruptcy courts should see that all the debtor's
creditors receive the most money possible, the courts should
also realize that the creditors are better off if the debtor is
able to avoid bankruptcy altogether. Congress should be willing
to remind courts of this fact through legislation that seeks
to protect refinancing lenders in the bankruptcy courts.
Encouraging refinancing by protecting lenders serves the
purpose of making more money available to every class of
creditors.

